Warfare in the 21st Century: 5 Questions with General Norton A. Schwartz

Posted On Feb 4, 2013 / 5773 | Challenges of the 21st Century | Israel Philosophy

We鈥檝e posted a number of sources below that speak to General Schwartz鈥檚 comments on warfare in the 21st century. Please continue the conversation in the Facebook chat box below.

To begin, here are the definitions of proportionality and distinction (also known as discretion), terms General Schwartz uses in the interview:

Proportionality: Proportionality prohibits the use of any kind or degree of force that exceeds that which is needed to accomplish the military objective. Proportionality compares the military advantage gained to the harm inflicted while gaining this advantage. Proportionality requires a balancing test between the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated by attacking a legitimate military target and the expected incidental civilian injury or damage. Under this balancing test, excessive incidental losses are prohibited. Proportionality seeks to prevent an attack in situations where civilian casualties would clearly outweigh military gains.

Distinction (Discretion): Distinction means discriminating between lawful combatant targets and noncombatant targets such as civilians, civilian property, POWs, and wounded personnel who are out of combat. The central idea of distinction is to only engage valid military targets. An indiscriminate attack is one that strikes military objectives and civilians or civilian objects without distinction. Distinction requires defenders to separate military objects from civilian objects to the maximum extent feasible.

鈥,鈥 by Rod Powers

The ancient Jewish philosopher Philo describes ethics in warfare, but does not base his statement on traditional Jewish texts:

When [the Jewish nation] takes up arms, it distinguishes between those whose life is one of hostility and the reverse. For to breathe slaughter against all, even those who have done very little or nothing amiss, shows what I should call a savage and brutal soul.

Philo, Loeb Classic Library (London: Heinemann, 1940), vol. 8, 鈥淭he Special Laws,鈥 4.225

Basing his comments on Deuteronomy 20:1, the medieval legalist Maimonides lays out parameters of fighting wars:

讗讬谉 注讜砖讬谉 诪诇讞诪讛 注诐 讗讚诐 讘注讜诇诐, 注讚 砖拽讜专讗讬谉 诇讜 诇砖诇讜诐–讗讞讚 诪诇讞诪转 讛专砖讜转, 讜讗讞讚 诪诇讞诪转 诪爪讜讛: 砖谞讗诪专 “讻讬 转拽专讘 讗诇 注讬专, 诇讛讬诇讞诐 注诇讬讛–讜拽专讗转 讗诇讬讛, 诇砖诇讜诐” (讚讘专讬诐 讻,讬).  讗诐 讛砖诇讬诪讜, 讜拽讬讘诇讜 砖讘注 诪爪讜讜转 砖谞爪讟讜讜 讘谞讬 谞讜讞 注诇讬讛谉–讗讬谉 讛讜专讙讬谉 诪讛谉 谞砖诪讛

One does not wage war against anyone without first calling out for peace, whether in a mitzvah war or a permitted war. As it is written: When you come near a city to wage war against it, call to it for peace鈥 (Deut. 20:1). If they surrender and accept the Seven Laws of Noah they are not killed.

Maimonides, Mishneh Torah: Laws of Kings and War 6:1

Rashi, the 11th-century commentator, in his comment on Exodus 14:7, seems to open the door for a permissive view of killing during wartime:

诪讻讗谉 讛讬讛 专讘讬 砖诪注讜谉 讗讜诪专 讻砖专 砖讘诪爪专讬诐 讛专讜讙

It is from this verse that Rabbi Shimon would say, 鈥渢he fit of the Egyptians were killed.鈥

Rashi on Exodus 14:7

The former chief rabbi of the Israel Defense Forces, Rabbi Shlomo Goren, in his 1983 book Mashiv Milhamah, seeks to limit the application of Rashi鈥檚 comment:

讜讗讬谉 讛讻讜讜谞讛 砖诪讜转专 讞住 讜讞诇讬诇讛 诇讛专讜讙诐 讘砖注讛 砖讗讬谞诐 谞诇讞诪讬诐 讘谞讜 讜讗讬谞诐 诪讛讜讬诐 注讘讜专谞讜 住讻谞讛 讜讻诇 讛诪讗诪专 砖诇 专砖讘”讬 讗谞讜 讗诇讗 诇讛讜专讜转 注诇 诪讛 砖讗讬专注 讘诪爪专讬诐  

The intention of this comment is not, Heaven forbid, to kill [enemies] when they are not fighting and when they are not endangering our lives. The statement from Rabbi Shimon is only meant to elucidate what happened in Egypt.

Rabbi Shlomo Goren, Mashiv Milhamah, (鈥淗aidrah Rabbah鈥: Jerusalem, 1983)

Finally, noted modern scholar Michael Walzer pushes back on the concept of a classic Jewish approach to fighting war:

The Rabbis themselves have no such (explicit) doctrine. Why is it that we think them committed to humanitarian restraint? Why were the modern theorists of 鈥減urity of arms鈥 so sure that theirs was the natural, with-the-grain reading of the tradition?

In fact, the tradition is rather thin, for the usual reason: there were no Jewish soldiers who needed to know what they could and could not do in battle. The law against murder would no doubt rule out direct attacks upon civilians, but the issue does not seem to have arisen (after the biblical period) until very recent times. Indirect attacks and unintended or incidental civilian deaths figure even less in the tradition.

Walzer, Michael, 鈥淲ar, Peace, and Jewish Tradition,鈥
(Princeton University Press: Princeton, 1996), 107

Questions to Consider

  • Do you agree with General Schwartz鈥檚 assertion that the fundamental nature of war has not changed?
  • What role should Jewish values鈥攐r religious values in general鈥攑lay in how and when we engage in conflict?